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AND

Let me begin with a slightly provocative remark: Philosophy and
science have many problems in common. One peculiar problem of philosophy is this: Very good philosophy can be wrong in substance, and
substantially correct philosophy can be utterly boring. Kant is an instance of the first, Husserl of the second case.
1. INTRODUCTION

The traditional view regarding the philosophy of mathematics in the
twentieth century is the dogma of three schools: Logicism, Intuitionism and Formalism. The problem with this dogma is not, at least not
first and foremost, that it is wrong, but that it is biased and essentially
incomplete. ‘Biased’ because it was formulated by one of the involved
parties, namely the logical empiricists – if I see it right – in order to
make their own position look more agreeable by comparison with Intuitionism and Formalism. ‘Essentially incomplete’ because there was
– and still exists – beside Frege’s Logicism, Brouwer’s Intuitionism and
Hilbert’s Formalism at least one further position, namely Husserl’s phenomenological approach to the foundations of arithmetic, which is also
philosophically interesting. In what follows, I want to do two things:
First, I will show that the standard dogma regarding the foundations of
mathematics is not only incomplete, but also inaccurate, misleading and
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basically wrong with respect to the three schools themselves. In doing
this I hope to make room for Husserl and his phenomenological approach as a viable alternative in the foundations of arithmetic. Second,
I will show how Husserl’s phenomenological point of view is a position
that fits exactly in between Frege’s “logicism”, properly understood, and
Hilbert’s mature proof theory, in which his so called “formalism” turns
out to be only a means to an end and not a goal in itself. In other words,
what I want to show is the following: (a) Frege is not the logicist he is
normally supposed to be, and (b) Hilbert is not the formalist that the
logical empiricists assumed he was. Finally, and in order to make the
list complete, (c) Weyl is not a radical intuitionist like Brouwer (except
for a very short period) but rather defends a much more moderate epistemological position and is actually one of Husserl’s closest allies with
respect to a Fundierung of mathematics – his secret advocate, so to say.
Now, some may wonder how I will be able to defend such an interpretation, standing as it does in opposition to most of what is said
and written about Frege, Hilbert and the other ‘founding-fathers’. My
answer to this legitimate question is simple and straightforward: There
is not only one Frege, one Hilbert and so on, but rather many different
Freges, Hilberts, etc. In other words, Frege and Hilbert developed quite
a number of different proposals, opinions and philosophical points of
view during their scientific careers, views that were later revised or substantially modified and sometimes even given up completely in favor of
a new approach. For example, we have to distinguish in Frege at least
three different periods in which he promoted fundamentally different
positions: (a) the early period of the Begriffsschrift (BS) in which he
envisaged his project of a proper foundation of arithmetic; (b) the long
and productive middle period of the Grundlagen (GA) and Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (GGA); and (c) the last period of the Philosophische Untersuchungen (PU), in which he (unsuccessfully) tried to find a
way to avoid Russell’s paradox. The case is similar for Hilbert. We
should distinguish at least three periods in which Hilbert pursued different projects regarding the foundations of mathematics: (a) the first
period from 1890 to 1900, in which he struggled with the Grundlagen
der Geometrie (GG), (b) the second period from 1915 to 1920, in which
he studied with his pupils (among other things) Russell’s Principia and
related writings – an enterprise whose fruits first became known 10
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years later as the ‘Hilbert-Ackermann’ text: Grundzuege der theoretischen Logik (GTL) – and (c) the third period from 1920 to 1928 or so, in
which he developed, together with his assistant Bernays, a radical, new
and ingenious program for the foundations of mathematics, his famous
proof-theory. These distinctions may seem uncontroversial and almost
trivial. But they are not. For instance, one need only take a look at
the exegetical literature on Frege. What is presented there as Frege’s
opinion or Frege’s point of view is frequently enough only a mixture
of quotations and opinions from different periods, which make little
sense and offer no reliable interpretation of Frege’s own original opinion. In the case of Hilbert things are even worse: interpreters are often
not aware that his work should be assessed in the light of his having
gone through different stages of development and tend to throw all of
Hilbert’s utterances together into the same pot.
In order to avoid such mistakes, let me state in advance which periods of Frege, Husserl and Hilbert I want to investigate and ask whether
there exists relationships between the basic views of these three authors. I begin with an investigation of Frege’s early writings from the
period of the BS and offer a fresh and unorthodox interpretation that
differs significantly from the standard exegesis of Frege as the father of
logicism. In the beginning Frege took the question of whether mathematics can be reduced to the laws of pure thinking to be an open one:
there were too many conceptual and inferential gaps in the proofs of
mathematical theorems, which first had to be closed in order to decide
this question definitively. Next, I turn to Husserl’s early writings. Here I
focus mainly on his considerations regarding a “true philosophy of the
calculus” and the Doppelvortrag that he held in Göttingen in 1901. I
will argue that – despite obvious stylistic differences – Husserl’s early
philosophy is much closer to Frege’s original aim in the BS than the
later writings suggest. Husserl’s main aim was – like Frege’s – a gapless foundation (Fundierung) of arithmetic; their opinions concerning
this matter differing primarily with respect to the question as to where
the causes for the gaps were to be located and, hence, by which means
they could be removed. I turn finally to Hilbert and his published and
unpublished writings from the 1920s concerning the New Foundations
of Arithmetic and the creation of proof-theory. In this context the year
1920 is important, because in the summer term of 1920 Hilbert had
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come to the definitive conclusion that the proposals of Russell and Weyl
are not feasible, that they do not lead to the desired result, i.e. a “firm
grounding” of mathematics. Hilbert’s proof-theory can be seen as a new
means to an old end, a basic aim he shares with Frege and Husserl: a
logically gapless foundation of mathematics.
2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREGE’S BEGRIFFSSCHRIFT

Frege’s first philosophically oriented publication was a small book with
the long title Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens published 1879. The book was no great success – to say the least – even though it laid out a program concerning the
foundations of mathematics that kept Frege busy over the next 20 years
and became a milestone in the formation of analytical philosophy as we
know it today. The poor reception of this work led Frege to attempt,
over the next three years, to present his ideas in a series of four essays,
two of which were published and two rejected. Perhaps because these
essays also failed to have the desired effect, Frege published another
small book entitled Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik in 1884, in which
he investigated from a more philosophical point of view the concept of
number and the different opinions of some authors: mathematicians
and philosophers of different schools and opposing opinions. Given its
subject matter, it is not surprising that this book became another cornerstone of analytical philosophy. After this it took another nine years
before Frege published the first volume of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik in 1893.
From the fact that Frege pursued the program he had originally outlined in the Begriffsschrift for more than 20 years one should not conclude that he did not change his opinions as to how to achieve the
desired goal. On the contrary, he changed his point of view significantly at least two times: the first change occurred sometime between
the Begriffsschrift and the Grundlagen; the second between the Grundlagen and the Grundgesetze, as Frege himself acknowledged in the preface
to Grundgesetze. One clarification: when speaking of the Begriffsschrift
one should always distinguish between two different meanings: the
book Frege called ‘Begriffsschrift’ on the one hand, and the “system of
thoughts” Frege denotes by the word ‘Begriffsschrift’ on the other; usu-

Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy

5

Ulrich Majer

ally the context makes clear which of the two meanings is intended.
Now let us ask, first, what is the significance of the book. And second,
what does Frege mean by ‘Begriffsschrift’. I will consider the second
question first. The best way to do this is to begin with a quotation
from the essay “Über den Zweck der Begriffsschrift”, in which Frege defended himself against the reproach of Schröder that he, i.e. Frege “had
left Boole’s achievements out of account”:
The reproach, however, essentially overlooks the fact that
my aim was different from Boole’s. I did not wish to present
an abstract logic in formulas, but to express a content through
written symbols in a more precise and perspicuous way
than is possible with words. In fact, I wished to produce,
not a mere calculus ratiocinator, but a lingua characterica, in
the Leibnizian sense. In doing so, however, I recognize that
deductive calculus is a necessary part of a conceptual notation. If this was misunderstood, perhaps it is because I let
the abstract logical aspect stand too much in the foreground.
(My emphasis. The translation by T. W. Bynum entails a remarkable mistake: Frege’s original term ‘characterica’ was
translated as ‘characteristica’, thus correcting silently a mistake that Frege had made in his answer to Schröder; see the
German quotation in the footnote.)1
This quotation entails a significant part of the answer to the second
question. But a correct understanding of the differences between Frege
and Boole seems to be a difficult issue; in my opinion most interpretations are faulty or go completely astray. The reason for the difficulty is
not hard to come by; it has two components: (1) contrary to what is
usually assumed, Frege’s distinction between calculus ratiocinator and
lingua characterica is far from trivial, indeed it is very curious, and (2)
most interpreters take it for granted that Frege’s reference to Leibniz is
correct and justified. But this is not the case, as Patzig noticed more
than 30 years ago: the expression “lingua characterica” is not only bad
Latin – characteristica would be correct – but also impossible for Leibniz
because the terms ‘lingua’ and ‘characteristica’ mean roughly the same!
In other words, the compound expression “lingua character[ist]ica” is
a pleonasmus in Leibnizian terms. The correct Leibnizian terms would
be either “lingua universalis” or “characteristica universalis”. But the
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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error goes much deeper: It’s not only a linguistic slip but also a substantial error because for Leibniz lingua universalis and calculus ratiocinator do not constitute an opposition, but rather complement each
other. They are, so to speak, the two sides of one and the same coin.
Consequently, something must be wrong with Frege’s supposition that
his distinction between calculus ratiocinator and lingua character[ist]ica
would be Leibniz’ distinction. And indeed his reference to Leibniz is
only indirect. Frege relies in this matter on an essay of Trendelenburg,
which he mentions in the preface to the Begriffsschrift and which is
entitled “Über Leibnizens Entwurf einer allgemeinen Charakteristik”.
But this is not all. Frege also adopts Trendelenburg’s interpretation of
Leibniz’ characteristica universalis as a “Begriffsschrift” – this is in fact
Trendelenburg’s term – and uses it to demarcate his own program of establishing a foundation for arithmetic from Boole’s intention to analyze
and construct logic in terms of algebra. Consequently if one wishes to
know how Frege understands the distinction between calculus ratiocinator and lingua characteristica one must consult, first of all, Trendelenburg’s essay, then the writings of Leibniz and finally, of course, Frege’s
own considerations.
As it occurs, if we follow the quotation, Frege did not want to create
a mere calculus ratiocinator, an ‘abstract logic’ – like Boole and Schröder
– but a universal characteristic, a Begriffsschrift as Trendelenburg calls
it, by means of which one can express a content (Inhalt) more transparently and perspicuously than is possible by means of ordinary language. So far, so good. One must, however, still ask what exactly Frege
means by ‘Begriffsschrift’ - even if we presume that we know what he
means by ‘abstract logic’ (which is not self-evident). Now, the meaningquestion has two answers, a wide and a narrow one: The wide meaning
of ‘Begriffsschrift’ is roughly the same as the meaning of the expression
‘scientific theory’: both denote the same kind of entities, whatever a scientific theory may be. The narrow meaning of ‘Begriffsschrift’ is nearly
identical with that what we today call logic. Take the following quote:
We can view the symbols of arithmetic, geometry, and chemistry as realizations of the Leibnizian idea [of a universal
characteristic] in particular areas. The “conceptual notation” offered here adds a new domain to these; indeed, the
one situated in the middle adjoining all the others. Thus,
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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from this starting point ... we can begin to fill in the gaps
in the existing formula languages, connect their hitherto
separate domains to the province of a single formula language and extend it to fields which up to now have lacked
such a language. (Italics are mine; the translation is by T.W.
Bynum; it entails an incorrectness because in the last sentence ‘the province of a single Begriffsschrift’ and not of a
‘single formula language’ is intended.)2
What Frege here says is roughly the following: There exists already
a small number of concept-scripts that are formed by the symbols and
rules of arithmetic, geometry and chemistry. Frege attaches to these already existing concept-scripts a new one, which fulfills two tasks: first,
it fills in the gaps in the existing concept-scripts, and second, it connects their separate territories into a single domain. But we have to
ask: What does Frege here mean by “gaps” and in what sense does the
new concept-script connect the domains of the different sciences into
a single domain? The answer to the first question is relatively easy:
Not only chemistry but also geometry and arithmetic use – beside their
specific symbols – a great number of words from ordinary language in
order to express their laws and the proofs of their statements. This is
a serious defect in Frege’s view, a “gap” with respect to a perfect language of science that has to be removed. Once this gap has been closed
by the design of a new concept-script all particular domains of the different sciences become connected with the central domain of the new
concept-script that lies in the middle of all the other territories. So far,
there can be little doubt what Frege has in mind; there remains only
one further question: What exactly is the central domain in the middle,
what is the particular territory of the new concept-script? The orthodox answer supposes that it is the territory of logic, more precisely that
of first and higher order predicate logic. But this does not seem quite
correct in the first place, and is furthermore insufficient, because the
orthodox view keeps silent about the question as to what the proper
domain of predicate logic is. Hence, let me explain what the correct
answer is (in my view) and where the orthodox view goes wrong.
If one studies the table of contents of the Begriffsschrift, one notices rather quickly that the latter contains no axiomatic presentation
of logic, only some examples of logically true sentences. This is no acwww.thebalticyearbook.org
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cident: At the time Frege wrote the Begriffsschrift, he had no theory of
logic! He had no idea how to present the laws of pure thinking in an
“axiomatic form”, i.e. in a deductive system that entailed all and only
those sentences that are “true” laws of thinking, logical theorems as we
say. He did not even consider that question, because he was not interested in a “theory” of logic. What he was interested in and what he did
consider in detail was something rather different: He wanted to know
which sentences of arithmetic could be proved exclusively by logical
means i.e. by inferences based only on the laws of thinking (and nothing else, in particular not on pure intuition as Kant had maintained).
The sole logical inference Frege relied on for this purpose was modus
ponens! Hence, in order to answer the question he had to analyze the
functional role of the logical concepts and relations in judgments and
logical inferences (therefore the name ‘concept-script’) and to represent
these functions by appropriate graphic signs. The totality of these signs
– together with the rules specifying how to use them in inferences – is
Frege’s Begriffsschrift in the narrow sense. The invention of the BS is
Frege’s lasting contribution to the further development of logic. But it
is not a theory of logic in the proper sense of the word ‘theory’. And
Frege did not claim that it was. For him, the invention of the Begriffsschrift was a means to an end, not a goal in itself, and the end he had in
mind was to find an answer to the open question whether all sentences
of arithmetic are “analytic” in the sense that they could be proven exclusively by modus ponens from the “laws of pure thinking”. Hence, the
real significance of the Begriffsschrift lies in the proof-procedure it enables. I say consciously “proof-procedure” and not proof-theory because
the procedure proposed by Frege in the BS is not the same as Hilbert’s
proof theory,which was developed forty years later, although it shares
some important features with it.
Before I turn to Husserl let me make two points of clarification: 1)
In the beginning Frege was not a logicist in the proper sense because
he didn’t claim that arithmetic is nothing but a branch of logic. On the
contrary, this was an open question for him, a question that he wanted
to investigate by means of his Begriffsschrift. However, a few years later,
when he wrote the Grundlagen, he was already convinced that at least
elementary arithmetic is a branch of logic, although he had no evidence
to support this conviction. The proof he would come up with had to
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wait another ten years until the publication of the Grundgesetze. However, the proof turned out to be faulty. 2) The second point is complementary to the first. In the beginning Frege was not the outspoken
anti-psychologist that most interpreters take him to be. In the preface
of the Begriffsschrift Frege distinguishes between two ways of cognition: The first way is the subjective cognition of a truth, the second its
objective foundation (Begründung in German). Of course, proofs belong
to the objective way of foundation, whereas the grasping of a thought
or the immediate recognition of the truth of a sentence (other than by
proof) is a subjective ability, which is, at least in part a matter of psychology. In other words Frege does not reject psychology absolutely, i.e.
under any circumstances; it is just not his business as a mathematician
who is interested primarily in the objective foundations of arithmetic
and nothing else.
3. HUSSERL’S “WAHRE PHILOSOPHIE DES KALKÜLS”

Husserl – 11 years younger than Frege – was a student of Weierstrass
in Berlin when Frege published the Begriffsschrift. In 1887 Husserl habilitated with a work entitled Über den Begriff der Zahl – three years
after Frege had published his second book, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. The Habilitation became part of Husserl’s first book Philosophie
der Arithmetik, which was published in 1891, the same year Frege published his essay Funktion und Begriff.
At first sight, Husserl’s early work and Frege’s BS have little in common. Not only is their style of writing and argumentation very different,
but their respective philosophical standpoints also seem to differ widely.
Husserl in Philosophy of Arithmetic took a psychological point of view
– so the standard story goes – whereas Frege argued, already in the
Begriffsschrift, that logical proofs that disregard the particular characteristic of things have nothing to do with psychology. But if we leave
aside for a moment the much-debated issue of psychology and focus
instead on the proper topic of their respective works, namely an inquiry
into the foundations of arithmetic, then their works are not so far apart
as it may appear.
I am aware that my thesis undermines the received view of Føllesdal,
according to which Husserl’s philosophical point of view underwent a
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dramatic change – a conversion from psychologism to anti-psychlogism
– as a result of Frege’s “devastating attack on the Philosophy of Aritmetic
in 1894”. In fact, I don’t mean to challenge this view – it seems to me
cum grano salis correct. I will rather try to identify the true dimensions
of this change of view on Husserl’s part. If am right that Husserl’s position before 1894 is not so distant from Frege’s objective notion of proof
as outlined in the Begriffsschrift, for Husserl too strived for a gapless
foundation of arithmetic, then the change in Husserl’s view regarding
the true foundations of arithmetic is actually less dramatic than it may
seem.
As it turns out, both Frege and Husserl are concerned with the foundations of arithmetic; both are convinced that the arithmetic of their
time lacks a safe and gapless foundation. Their opinions differ, however, when it comes to the question as to the real causes for the gaps
and, consequently, how a firm and gapless foundation can be achieved.
This question is, of course, intimately connected with another fundamental question, namely, what are numbers? Here again Frege’s and
Husserl’s opinions point in different directions. But before we can assess the true significance of Husserl’s turn from psychologism to antipsychologism we have to distinguish at least two questions and answer
them separately: (1) Did Husserl change his view with respect to the
real causes of the gaps in the foundations of arithmetic before 1894?
And if so, did he adjust his program of a gapless foundation of arithmetic correspondingly? Because the answer to this question is almost
entirely negative, the further question arises: (2) Are the differences
between Husserl’s and Frege’s viewpoints regarding psychology so extreme that one should speak of a “conversion”? In order to answer this
question we must take a closer look at their respective positions.
In the Begriffsschrift, Frege had hoped – it was not more than a hope
as it turned out 22 years later – that he could reduce all sentences of
arithmetic to “laws of pure thinking” by means of his proof-procedure
and in this way reduce the concept of number to the concept of Anordnung in einer Reihe (order in a sequence). But if we want to do justice to
Husserl, we should not exaggerate Frege’s achievements and this means
that we have to accept the fact that even if Frege had been able to carry
out his program successfully, several questions would nevertheless have
remained open: what are “laws of pure thinking”, how do we recognize
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them and what is their ontological status? Of course, Frege leaves little
doubt as to the fact that he thinks that they are something absolute and
“objective”, that they do not depend on this or that human being, but
only on the “conceptual content” of a sentence. But this answer has at
least two serious shortcomings. (1) The objectivity of the laws of thinking – even if granted – does not settle the question of their ontological
status. Few mathematicians doubt that numbers are something objective, but the ontological question whether they are individual objects
or general concepts is not settled by this conviction. (2) In Frege, the
presumed objectivity of the laws of thinking drops, so to say, from the
sky. Frege does not offer the slightest argument for it in the Begriffsschrift and what he later says in this respect in the Grundlagen seems
to me to be at best inconclusive. Let’s consider the Begriffsschrift. The
main distinction he introduces in the preface is the opposition between
two ways of recognition of a scientific truth: (a) the subjective way
of guessing, grasping, having sense impressions and experiences in the
widest sense; (b) the objective way of drawing logical inferences, either
by inductive corroboration [Befestigung] or, more important and reliable, by logical deduction as a consequence from another truth, i.e. by
proof. Now the interesting point is that the recognition of the laws of
pure thinking is not implied by (b): their truth can neither be proven
by logical deduction nor by inductive corroboration. On the contrary,
their validity has to be presupposed in every logical inference. This is
what I mean when I say that their objectivity drops from the sky: The
recognition of “the laws of pure thinking” seems to belong either to (a)
– which Frege brands as psychology – or Frege has to admit a third way,
a new immediate source of cognition for the laws of pure thinking.
So, why should Husserl have adopted Frege’s reductionist and antipsychologist point of view instead of pursuing his own program? I see
no plausible reason. At any rate, this is exactly what happened: Husserl
held on to his own program even when he changed his view with respect
to psychology. It is important to note that Husserl’s change to Frege’s
anti-psychologism fell together with his new interest in the epistemological foundations of logic, which eventually resulted in the Logical
Investigations of 1901, but had nothing to do with his program of a firm
and gapless “Fundierung” of arithmetic. The reason for this remarkable
fact is not hard to come by. Because Husserl never shared Frege’s logi-
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cism, i.e. his goal of a complete and gapless reduction of arithmetic to
the “laws of pure thinking”, he located the gaps in the foundations of
arithmetic not in the lack of a Begriffsschrift, but in certain shortcomings
of his own “genetic” program.
So let us see, what Husserl’s program of a firm and gapless “Fundierung” of arithmetic was, and furthermore, where precisely he felt
that certain shortcomings in his program would endanger the goal of a
gapless foundation of arithmetic. After this we will better understand
in which ways Husserl’s genetic approach differs from Frege’s program
of a reduction of arithmetic to logic.
Husserl’s long-winded style of writing as well as the fact that important texts from the early period were first published in 1983 under the
title “Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie” bring about at least one
difficulty. Most of these texts are blueprints for the second volume of the
Philosophie der Arithmetik, which Husserl did not publish. They contain
philosophical considerations concerning the concept of “calculus” that
allow us to establish two important facts. First, it allows us to explain
what the main point of Husserl’s critique of Frege’s conception of numbers as extensions of concepts is, and, second, in which way Husserl’s
conception of calculus is essential for the foundations of arithmetic.
I do not know a shorter way to tackle the first task than to quote
Weyl’s summary of Husserl’s Philosophie der Arithmetik, as he presented
it in his Habilitations-Vortrag in Göttingen in 1910:
The concept of set and number has run through various
stages during the development of the human intellect. At
the first stage it concerns the proper idea of a totality [Inbegriff] which emerges when representations of several individual objects, recognized as such, are raised by a unified
interest to the content of our consciousness and held together. On this level, the lowest numerals, say 2, 3, and 4,
designate immediately recognizable differences of the mental act coming into function in forming the idea of a totality.
At the second level symbolic representations stand for the
proper ones. The most significant result of this second period is the procedure of symbolic counting, familiar to every
child, which permits us to differentiate more comprehensive sets according to their number.
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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Because we are compelled by other irrefutable reasons to
introduce infinite sets – indeed analysis alone forces this –
when we finally come to the third level, where we erect the
theory of finite and infinite sets and numbers in a scientifically systematic way by setting up appropriate axioms,
definitions and the consequences drawn from them. (Weyl,
GA, Vol. 1, pp. 302, my translation)
According to Weyl, Husserl distinguishes between three levels in the
formation numbers: the proper, the symbolic, and the axiomatic stages.
Considerations of the first two levels already suffice to make clear one
principal difference between Husserl and Frege: Frege doesn’t accept
Husserl’s first level as necessary – nor even as helpful – for an analysis of
the concept of number. One might think that this difference is not very
important because it concerns only the “genesis” of numbers and this is,
from Frege’s point of view, merely a matter of psychology. But not for
Husserl who is mainly interested in the real genesis of numbers and this
is not a matter of psychology but of objective construction. Yet, there are
further differences involving Husserl’s levels two and three, which are
important for two reasons: On the one hand, Husserl does not accept
Frege’s conception of numbers as “extensions of concepts”. The conception of number is epistemologically prior to the notion of concepts and
their extensions. On the other hand, Philosophie der Arithmetik is in a
certain sense an unfinished book that is in need of supplementation – a
fact of which Husserl was well aware and about which we must be clear
in order to understand the need for an “axiomatic level”. Let’s take the
first point first.
Why does Weyl say “At the second level symbolic representations
stand for the proper ones”. What is the sense of this statement? The
answer has two parts, a negative and a positive one; the negative is
this: the genesis of numbers in the ‘proper’ sense does not go beyond
the number 13 or so, because we cannot, according to Husserl, represent more than 13 distinct objects at the same time in our conscious
attention. Consequently, if we want to count beyond 13 we have to
represent these numbers through “artificial” symbols. This claim is the
basis of Husserl’s critique of Frege’s conception of number: if there is
no objective reason (that is, no reason except our epistemic limitations)
to distinguish the symbolized numbers from the proper ones, then both
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have the same ontological status – both exist independently of any further condition. But if this is the case then Frege’s contention “that every
number-statement is a statement about a concept” is untenable. Frege’s
position implies that numbers are dependent on concepts. Because this
is misguided from a mathematical point of view (we use numbers in
equations without mentioning any concept) Frege tries to improve the
definition of numbers by introducing the idea of equivalent classes, and
does so in two steps. First he introduces the relation “gleichzahlig mit”
and then he switches to the extension [Umfang] of the concept gleichzahlig; according to his definition, which states that “the [cardinal]
number, which belongs to the concept F, is the extension [Umfang] of
the concept ‘equal in number [numerically equal?] with the concept
F”’. (GA, p. 79/80)3 I think Husserl is right: This “amendment” makes
things worse.
In what sense is Philosophie der Arithmetik an unfinished book? Of
course, I do not have the trivial sense of “unfinished” in mind. It is not
only that Husserl did not finish the second volume of PA, but rather
that his systematic perspective remains fragmentary: the first volume
does not contain an account of the third, axiomatic level. This level is
however absolutely indispensable for a proper foundation of arithmetic,
because infinite sets and numbers are first introduced on the third level;
without these arithmetic would remain a torso.
At this point two questions arise. (i) How did Weyl know about the
third level? (ii) Why did Husserl not include the third level in the first
volume but postponed its treatment to the second volume that never appeared? The first question is easy to answer: Weyl, an excellent mathematician, immediately saw what was lacking in Husserl’s Philosophy
of Arithmetic. The second question is far more difficult to answer, because we must not only recognize which problem troubled Husserl, but
also understand what the nature of the problem was and why it was so
difficult for Husserl to find an appropriate solution and therefore why
Husserl postponed the treatment of this question to the second volume.
In order to find the right answer to these questions we must remember where we stand on level two, what we have achieved with the symbolic representation of numbers. It’s not much – from a mathematical
point of view. Weyl is very precise in this respect when he says that “The
most significant result of this second stage is the procedure of symbolic
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counting, familiar to every child, that permits us to differentiate more
comprehensive sets according to their number [cardinality].” In other
words, we have arrived at the level of symbolic counting and, with it,
to the generation of the potentially infinite sequence of natural numbers or positive integers. What we have not reached, not yet reached at
any rate, are the four simple methods of calculation or – as Husserl calls
them – the “four species of arithmetical operations”: addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. The fact that Husserl stopped here is
rather strange, because mere counting is certainly not arithmetic in the
full sense; it is only a tiny fragment of ordinary arithmetic that does
not allow us to express interesting arithmetical laws. For this reason
we should ask: Why did Husserl not get to the arithmetical operations?
Why is the introduction of the four arithmetical operations apparently
a problem for Husserl? Why can we not simply define them? From our
contemporary perspective, nothing seems easier than that! And even if
it is true that we cannot define them simpliciter, what is the obstacle or
deeper impediment to a definition in a more elaborate sense? Now, I
think that if we find the correct answer to these questions this will also
throw some light on two other questions, namely what does Husserl
mean when he writes, in the preface to Philosophie der Arithmetik: “I
will perhaps succeed, at least in some fundamental points, to open the
way. . . to a true philosophy of the calculus” (PA, p. 7) and why he
did not achieve this goal, at least not completely insofar as an essential
part of his considerations regarding “the true philosophy of the calculus” was missing in the first volume of Philosophie der Arihtmetik. But
just what is missing? A first hint comes from the table of contents of
Husserliana XXI. Here we find (among other things) titles like: “Die
formale und wirkliche Arithmetik”, “Die wahren Theorien”, “Die Theorien der Erweiterung des Zahlgebietes”. In particular, the last paper
gives a clue as to what is “missing” in PA: we cannot execute the operation of subtraction or division, at least not unlimitedly, because the
domain of natural numbers is too small or, better, too restricted: If you
want to subtract b from a, then, if b is larger than a, you will end in the
“middle of nowhere”. In other words, when a is exhausted without our
having finished the operation of subtracting b from a, we have to stop,
we can go nowhere, because there are no further elements, from which
one could subtract the remaining elements of b. In order to execute
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the operation completely you have to introduce the so-called “negative”
numbers. But these are no numbers in the first place, at least not on
the inductive level of “symbolic counting”, and second they cannot be
introduced by definition, because such a definition would have to be
“creative in the sense that it generates a new kind of numbers that have
to be united with the already existing domain of positive integers to
form a new comprehensive domain of numbers, the whole numbers”.
Corresponding arguments are valid with respect to other arithmetical
operations like division, the extraction of roots and other arithmetical
operations. In other words, the different methods of calculation force us
to expand the domain of natural numbers again and again in different
directions.
The necessity of domain-expansion is the main obstacle when it comes
to the problem of getting from the second level of symbolic counting
and the potentially infinite sequence of natural numbers to the third
level of quantification over all numbers and the formulation of true universal laws and thus to the actual infinite. The logical reason for this difficulty is not hard to come by: If the original domain of numbers is not
properly defined, then the domain of natural numbers is too restricted
to execute the different arithmetical operations and we have to ‘expand’
it; but if we expand it ‘piecemeal’ then the domain of numbers is not
properly defined. And if the domain of numbers is not properly defined
then the domain of individual variables is not properly defined either
and the quantifiers loose their precise meaning. But if the quantifiers
have no precise meaning you cannot state the mathematical principle
of complete induction, which is a necessary precondition for the formulation of true universal laws and this means you will never arrive at
the third level, the level of the actual infinite. Consequently, we must
find a different way to introduce arithmetical operations than a stepwise expansion of the Ur-domain of natural numbers. But the question
is: How can we do it without opening up new gaps? Weyl’s proposal in
the last passage of the above quote, to pursue an axiomatic approach,
was not acceptable to Husserl for quite a while (roughly until 1900) because the axiomatic approach per se could not avert the danger of gaps
in the foundations of arithmetic and analysis. But this changed at the
latest in 1901, when Husserl had ‘convinced himself’ that he had found
a method by which he could close (or at least bridge) the gaps in the
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axiomatic approach between the Ur-domain of natural numbers and the
expanded domains of negative, rational, and irrational numbers.
Now, what is Husserl’s way out of this difficulty? For some years
he did not know how to deal with the problem of “domain-expansion”;
he considered different ideas, for example that of a “parallelism” between a mere calculus of the four arithmetic operations (set up by a
formal calculus) and the symbolic arithmetic on level two. But he soon
dropped this idea. The eventual solution was presented in Husserl’s
famous “Doppelvortrag” in Göttingen in 1901. The basic idea of this
solution has two parts: First, Husserl accepts Hilbert’s “axiomatic point
of view” with respect to the presentation of a “calculus” for the different
arithmetic operations and their different domains, and then, in a second step, tries to bridge the gap between the domains of the different
calculi and the Ur-domain of natural numbers (generated by inductive
counting) the calculus and that of real arithmetic on level two by means
of the concept of conservative theory-extension of the Ur-domain. I cannot go into the details, (I have done this elsewhere), but I will at least
sketch the basic idea.
Let me begin with the preliminary remark that Husserl had to develop this notion “on his own behalf” because the idea underlying this
notion was by no means known in 1900 and the expression ‘conservative theory-extension’ was first introduced much later. The idea is this:
If we extend a given theory – let’s say the theory of natural numbers – by
adding new axioms this can be done in several distinct ways. The two
most important ways are the following: (i) we add one (or several) new
axioms in an already introduced language (i.e. without the introduction of new expressions for individuals and their relations), or (ii) we
first extend the given language by new expressions and then state new
axioms by using, in addition to the old expressions, the new one. The
first case is best known from Hilbert’s book Foundations of Geometry,
in which Hilbert sets up a theory of Euclidean geometry by the stepwise addition of more and more axioms until the theory is complete (i.e.
categorical in the modern sense). In this way the meaning of the geometrical expressions “point”, “line”, “between” etc. changes and, more
importantly, gradually sharpens until the domain of the geometrical elements cannot be expanded any further for the sake of consistency. This
is precisely what the axiom of completeness in Hilbert’s Foundations of
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Geometry asserts. The second case of theory-extension, i.e. the extension of a theory together with the extension of the language of the theory, had not been studied before Husserl’s “Doppelvortrag”, presumably
because most scientists regarded this case as trivial and uninteresting,
at least from a logical point of view. But it is not, as we will see in a
moment. Husserl is the first, as far as I know, to have investigated this
case more closely.
In case of a theory-extension together with a simultaneous extension
of language one has to distinguish between two cases, a trivial and an
intriguing one. The trivial case is that in which the new expressions
stand in no inner relations to the old ones, because there is no law which
ties their meaning together. They denote different kinds of entities,
which are intrinsically independent of each other. Take for example the
‘age of the captain of a ship’. The age of the captain has nothing to
do with the ‘length of his ship’; both are independent of each other (at
least under normal circumstances). The intriguing case is that in which
the new expressions stand in an inner relation to the already familiar
expressions, like in the case of “theoretical concepts”, such as mass and
force, and their “observational basis”.
Now the interesting point is that in the case of arithmetic the “new”
number-expressions for the negative, rational, and irrational numbers
also stand in certain, yet not completely clarified relations to the already
“familiar” numbers, the positive whole integers. This is, of course, well
known. But the remarkable point is now that Husserl set out to analyze
these relations by distinguishing two cases with respect to an extension
of the theory of arithmetic. In the first case, the addition of new axioms
and terms permits a deduction of “new” theorems in the “old” language
for the domain of the natural numbers, which could not be deduced in
the unextended theory. In the second case, such a deduction of new
theorems in the old language is not possible: the Mannigfaltigkeit of
valid formulas in the old language is not changed by the addition of
new axioms. This kind of theory-extension is called “conservative” – in
distinction to the first “creative” type of theory-extension – because it
keeps the set of theorems in the old restricted language invariant, i.e.
constant; in particular the set of valid equations between the natural
numbers is not changed by the new axioms. Husserl has put great emphasis on this distinction because he was convinced that he could bridge
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the gap between the second and third level of the theory of numbers
by sticking to the idea of conservative theory-extension. The leading
thought is this: If the theory extension is conservative then the new
axioms do not change the “meaning” of the old terms because the new
introduced elements (the negative, rational and irrational numbers) do
not “interfere” with the old ones, the whole positive integers; they only
join them in order to complete and “close” the domain with respect to
the 4 arithmetical operations. Whether Husserl was right, I will not discuss here. But it goes without saying that from a philosophical point of
view the meta-mathematical notion of a conservative theory-extension
has a great deal of attraction for the gapless and rigorous foundation of
arithmetic.
I will not close without a brief sketch of Husserl’s philosophical position between the two poles of Frege and Hilbert. The best way to characterize the relation between Husserl and Frege is perhaps to borrow
a phrase from the philosophy of science: Both pursued similar but different research programs, which stood in competition with each other.
Both aimed at a firm and gapless foundation of arithmetic. Because
Frege identified the principal gaps with errors arising from the use of
words from ordinary language in mathematical proofs, he tried to invent a concept-script that could be substituted for ordinary language.
But this was not Husserl’s point of view – at least not before 1900 –
and for this reason he showed little interest in Frege’s logical notation.
Husserl instead identified the main gaps with the problem of the expansion of the Ur-domain of natural numbers to the larger domains
of negative, rational and other numbers in connection with the arithmetical operations. Therefore he tried to find a method to close the
gaps by meta-mathematical considerations and the generation of metamathematical concepts. The method of conservative theory-extension
seemed to him the appropriate instrument. In this connection two
points are very important. Husserl’s turn from psychologism to Frege’s
anti-psychologism in 1894 did not affect his research program regarding a gapless Fundierung of arithmetic, let alone change his eventual
solution. On the other hand Frege didn’t recognize that Husserl’s approach in the Philosophie der Arithmetik was not a psychological but
a “genetic” one (as Weyl correctly noticed). Mainly for this reason, I
think, Frege could not imagine that Husserl’s research program might
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be successful, in particular when Husserl eventually adopted Hilbert’s
meta-mathematical point of view. The latter was so fundamentally different from Frege’s own point of view that he could not appreciate its
merits.
Notes
1
Bei jenem Vorwurfe ist aber dies hauptsächlich übersehen, dass mein Zweck ein anderer als Booles war. Ich wollte nicht eine abstracte Logik in Formeln darstellen, sondern
einen Inhalt durch geschriebene Zeichen in genauerer und übersichtlicherer Weise zum
Ausdruck bringen, als es durch Worte möglich ist. Ich wollte in der Tat nicht einen blossen
“calculus ratiocinator”, sondern eine “lingua characterica” im leibnizschen Sinne schaffen,
wobei ich jene schlussfolgernde Rechnung immerhin als einen notwendigen Bestandtheil
einer Begriffsschrift anerkenne. Wenn dies verkannt wurde, soliegt das vielleicht daran,
dass ich in der Ausführung das abstract Logische zu sehr in den Vordergund habe treten
lassen. (italics are mine, except the Latin words in quotation marks)
2
“Man kann in den arithmetischen, geometrischen, chemischen Zeichen Verwirklichungen des Leibnizischen Gedankens [einer allgemeinen Charakteristik] für einzelne
Gebiete sehen. Die hier vorgeschlagene Begriffsschrift fügt diesen ein neues hinzu und
zwar das in der Mitte gelegene, welches allen anderen benachbart ist. Von hier aus
lässt sich daher ... eine Ausfüllung der Lücken der bestehenden Formelsprachen, eine
Verbindung ihrer getrennten Gebiete zum Bereiche einer einzigen [BS] und eine Ausdehnung auf Gebiete ins Werk setzen, die bisher einer solchen [BS] ermangelten.” (BS, p
XII)
3
“die Anzahl, welche dem Begriffe F zukommt ist der Umfang des Begriffes “gleichzahlig dem Begriffe F”.”
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